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ABSTRACT
India’s 2009 policy on biodiesel remains controversial to date.
It excludes voices of marginalized people such as landless
workers and knowledges associated with diverse feedstock
cultivation practices. It considers the ‘upscaling’ of biodiesel
production to be straightforward, based on easy
transferability between diverse socio-material contexts. The
policy’s marginalization of the immense diversity of India’s
lands, peoples, perspectives, and practices is based on a
neglect of socio-material relations and their multiplicity. A
relational analysis highlights the need for alternate inclusive
policy processes. Such processes include as evidence the
diverse knowledges of interested people and relevant
things. They recognize that each entity is known differently
depending on how its socio-material relations are
approached. Inclusive policy processes also highlight the
adjustments that are required to translate a policy out of
one socio-material setting and into another. Finally,
inclusive policy processes help build realities relying not
only on the knowledges from policy experts and firms, but
also on the marginalized knowledges of grassroots actors
such as smallholders and environmental activists.
KEYWORDS
policy assemblages;
knowledge politics;
participation; inclusion;
biofuels; sustainability
Introduction
Since the release of India’s National Mission on Bio-Diesel in 2003 (Planning
Commission, 2003), biodiesel in India has been embroiled in an intense,
multi-sided political controversy. Central to the controversy in India and in
many other countries are issues such as land classifications, smallholders’
incomes, and the role of high-yielding seeds (Baka, 2014; de Hoop et al.,
2016). For instance, the argument that millions of hectares of the so-called was-
teland are available for growing biodiesel feedstock in India (e.g. Gopinathan
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and Sudhakaran, 2009) is criticized by activists and academics for exacerbating
land grabs and displacing cattle grazing (Lahiri, 2009; Baka, 2014). Similarly,
while some predict that biodiesel cash crops will be highly profitable (e.g.
Misra and Murthy, 2011; Kumar et al., 2012), others argue that the cultivation
of crops such as Jatropha curcas, under the most favourable conditions, can
be profitable only for large farmers. Smallholders growing Jatropha are con-
sidered vulnerable to crop failure and economic damage (see, for example,
Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010; Rittenburg et al., 2011; de Hoop, 2018).
In 2009, India released its National Policy on Biofuels. Political issues raised
by the 2009 policy have not reached closure (Dalemans et al., 2019). Societal and
academic debates on the empirical evidence behind the policy are still ongoing
(e.g. Shahare and Thayyil, 2020). In the face of these controversies, we ask: How
are some knowledges made to count as ‘evidence’ in India’s 2009 policy? How
does the policy exclude diverse knowledges? How does this selectivity relate to
the policy’s overall aims? And how might policymaking be made more inclusive
of marginalized knowledges? These questions are clearly relevant beyond biodie-
sel policymaking. Politics of diverse knowledges in policies are debated across
many different areas, from climate change to agricultural development in
India and internationally (see e.g. Arora, 2012; Mabeza, 2013; Strassheim and
Kettunen, 2014; Brugnach et al., 2017; Arora, 2019).
Past research engaging with India’s biodiesel policy predominantly focuses
on making substantive recommendations including: (a) the promotion of
locally available flora (Agoramoorthy and Patel, 2011); (b) the cultivation of
a wider diversity of (multi-purpose) crops (Rajagopal, 2008; Dewangan
et al., 2018); (c) amending land-use policy to facilitate cultivation on
‘under – or un-utilized land reserves’ (Altenburg et al., 2009); (d) the recog-
nition of existing uses of government-owned ‘marginal’ lands, such as cattle
husbandry (Biswas et al., 2010); and (e) improving conversion efficiency
(e.g. Jungman et al., 2016). These studies do not directly explore the political
process of policymaking. Instead, they are concerned with making recommen-
dations for a better biodiesel policy.
Studies on the process of biofuel policymaking more generally highlight ‘pol-
itical-economic forces’ behind the policies and discuss how advocacy attempts
by NGOs largely failed to change these policies. For example, Chaliganti and
Müller (2016) point out how India’s 2009 policy is underpinned by technocratic
design principles. Pradhan and Ruysenaar (2014) show how NGOs unsuccess-
fully protested biodiesel policymaking on the grounds that the benefit to small
farmers can only be very limited. Silencing smallholders’ voices, the policy
aimed to gain credibility from the support of high-profile actors keen on a
strong pro-biodiesel policy. Such policies are ill-equipped to achieve the
environmental and pro-poor developmental goals that they themselves define
(Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010). Beyond India, Oliveira et al. (2017) demonstrate
that biofuel policymaking is dominated by alliances between corporate and state
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interests (e.g. energy security). To satisfy such interests, policies can cherry-pick
evidence from a diverse body of uncertain knowledges (Parkhurst, 2017).
Responding to some of the concerns highlighted above, German and Goetz
(2017) offer procedural recommendations for developing ‘sustainable’ biofuel
policies. Calling for careful evaluation of biofuels’ potential to achieve specific
social and ecological aims and for an evidence-based participatory planning
process, German et al. recommend that any ‘scaling up’ of biofuel production
should be preceded by in-depth small-scale experimentation. While such a
focus on policymaking processes rather than policy outcomes is useful,
German et al.’s promotion of unproblematic evidence, ‘evaluation’ and ‘exper-
imentation’ procedures fails to take seriously issues such as: (a) policy-driven
production of evidence that instrumentally serves predefined policy aims
(Holmes and Clark, 2008); (b) the political controversies surrounding biofuel
knowledges (e.g. Rometsch, 2012; Rietig, 2016); and (c) the uncertainties and
ambiguities that are inherent to all knowledge (Wynne, 1992; Stirling, 2015).
As we will argue in this paper, participatory procedures that do not problematize
what counts as evidence also obscure the complex webs of socio-material
relations that afford the production of multiple knowledges of the ‘same’
entity (Mol, 2002; Latour, 2005).
We develop such a socio-material relational approach to the role of knowl-
edge in policymaking. In this approach, the relations that matter for the pro-
duction of knowledges and their articulation into policy, bring together not
only the ‘social’ worlds of humans with their values and interests but also the
‘material’ worlds variously composed of tools, technologies, and the biophysical
environment. The social and material worlds intermix and constitute each other
(Latour, 2005). We develop this socio-material approach by focusing on the
2003–2009 policymaking process in India, examining the inclusion of some
forms of knowledge as evidence and the accompanying exclusion of diverse
knowledges. We conclude the paper by proposing three normative principles
of inclusive policymaking processes. These are (a) articulating the diverse knowl-
edges of interested people, associated with relevant things; (b) respecting each
entity’s multiplicity based on differences in the socio-material relations they
are embedded in; and (c) recognizing the adjustments entailed in translating a
policy from one socio-material setting to another.
A Relational Approach to Policymaking
Attempts to include diverse voices and interests in policymaking often promote
‘public participation’ (e.g. Nowlin, 2011; Ng’ombe et al., 2012; Shahare and
Thayyil, 2020). Inclusion through public participation in policymaking is argued
to improve the effectiveness of problem-solving in society (Barry et al., 2008; Löv-
brand, 2011). Critiques of ‘participation,’ however, argue that it is often applied in
instrumental and legalistic ways, without addressing power relations that prevent
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the inclusion of diversity in the first place and that shape how public participation
unfolds in practice (Stirling, 2008; Wesselink et al., 2011).
Indeed, public participation can overlook the role of dominating political
associations, economic interests, and state-based visions in policymaking
(Jasanoff and Kim, 2009; Wetzstein and Le Heron, 2010). These associations,
interests, and visions structure ‘public reason’ around particular techno-scien-
tific evidence and developmentalist rationalities of national security and
wealth creation, while obscuring uncertainties and marginalizing voices based
on alternate plural knowledges (Stirling, 2008; Arora, 2019). Such marginaliza-
tion and exclusion can be revealed by public controversies around sciences and
technologies. Controversies bring into relief a wide range of contrasting voices
associated with people and things, humans and non-humans, in society and
nature (cf. Latour, 2005). These voices often express various ‘lay’ and ‘expert’
knowledge claims (Callon et al., 2009).
All voices representing knowledge claims are not just raised by individual
actors. Instead, they are produced relationally (Latour, 2005), by heterogeneous
assemblages of interrelated humans and non-humans. In addition to bodies and
skills, assemblages are composed of entities such as concepts, models, pro-
cedures, regulations, norms, interests, values, visions, material artefacts, and bio-
physical processes (Verran, 2009; Ureta, 2014).
A particular voice raised by a spokesperson to represent another human or
non-human is contingent on the specific composition of their assemblage (Mol,
2002; Latour, 2010; Arora et al., 2013). The ‘same’ (non)human can be rep-
resented in different ways. For example, a soil sample may be variously rep-
resented by different assemblages in pedology, smallholder agriculture, and
anthropology (Latour, 1999). A pedology assemblagemay includemaps, field sur-
veying techniques, fieldworkers collecting soil samples from a forest, plastic bags,
theMunsell code,1 and laboratory equipment. In contrast, a smallholder’s assem-
blage might rely on the texture of soil felt between her fingers, its colour (without
using a standardized code), dampness and odour, with the purpose of deciding
which cropsmight be suitable to grow in the soil. The anthropologist’s assemblage
may be composed of entities such as a notebooks, pens, academic literature, (phi-
losophical or sociological) concepts, a camera, and the skill of following her inter-
locutors as they perform everyday practices relating to soils.
Here, it is crucial to emphasize that we associate voices with humans and non-
humans (Latour, 2005). Non-humans such as soil samples are enrolled into
assemblages and their ‘characteristics’ are generally articulated through
human spokespersons such as smallholders and soil scientists (Callon, 1986).
As noted above, different spokespersons may know and speak for the same
non-human differently, depending on the composition of their respective assem-
blages. Unfortunately, these plural assemblages entangling the same entity, and
the resulting diversity of voices and knowledges, can be made invisible through
centring attention on narrow evidence provided by ‘expert’ spokespersons.
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On the basis of their acknowledged expertise, some spokespersons generally
gain more influence in (participatory) policymaking processes. This unequal
influence is buttressed by the policy assumption that voices associated with
non-humans are based on evidence only if the spokespersons are modern scien-
tists and engineers (as exemplified by German et al.’s 2017 procedural rec-
ommendations discussed above; also see Mitchell, 2002). In this process, some
‘scientific’ entities such as mathematical models and theoretical concepts com-
posing the assemblages of modern scientists and engineers may be made
public (Latour and Wiebel, 2005; Carolan, 2010). However, many other entities
and relations constituting the same assemblages may be obscured or suppressed,
including:
a) the occlusion of powerful interests and visions that shape knowledge pro-
duction and lobbying through assemblages, in order to make some voices
dominant as ‘evidence’ for policy (Jasanoff, 2004);
b) the suppression of situatedness and uncertainties inherent to all knowledge
(Haraway, 1991; Stirling, 2015), which helps justify the view that policies
based on techno-scientific knowledges are unproblematically transferrable
out of a particular setting. This obscures the adjustments made to knowl-
edges through learning and adaptation, as they are used in new settings;
c) the exclusion from policymaking of a wide range of voices based on knowl-
edges produced in assemblages that are not controlled by modern scientists
and engineers. The excluded voices are often articulated by spokespersons
such as grassroots activists and small/marginal farmers.
The above forms of exclusion and suppression lead to a ‘narrowing of vision’
(cf. Scott, 1998; Palmer, 2014). They also help construct ostensibly neutral cat-
egories of ‘the scientific’ and ‘the technical’ by trying to separate modern sciences
and technologies from politics (cf. Latour, 2004; Li, 2007).
Attempting to defy this separation and challenge modernist exclusions, we
emphasize two aspects of the politics of assemblages that enable the raising of
voices. First, the procedural, discursive, and material entities constituting an
assemblage hang together in (asymmetric) relations of power (Callon, 2008;
Verran, 2009). This means that some entities constituting an assemblage may
be more powerful than others in shaping how a voice is raised. The more power-
ful entities may include economic interests of investors and scientific discourses
considered accurate representations of reality. This means that all assemblages
are political, including those producing modern techno-scientific facts and arte-
facts. Yet, as noted above, political assemblages controlled by modern ‘expertise’
can obscure how they are constituted by power. They can, therefore, be pre-
sumed as apolitical.
Second, a particular composition of an assemblage (at a specific time) is one
of many existing and possible compositions (Mol, 2002; Lave, 2015). If this
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multiplicity of assemblages is marginalized, some voices associated with an
entity are silenced. Such silencing can create a situation that an entity is rep-
resented through just one voice, turning the entity into a repetitive singularity.
As discussed above, the voice that is often favoured as authoritative evidence
may be based on knowledge produced by an ‘expert’ assemblage that suppresses
uncertainties and occludes how it is constituted by powerful political-economic
forces (Latour, 1988; Stirling, 2008). By claiming an exclusive attachment to the
categories ‘science’ and ‘technology,’ modern expert assemblages can margina-
lize other practitioners’ knowledges by treating them as non-technical and
non-scientific (Agrawal, 1995; Arora, 2019). Diverse technical, ecological, and
medical knowledges may then be boxed into essentializing categories such as
‘indigenous,’ ‘vernacular,’ ‘traditional,’ ‘local,’ or even ‘subaltern’ (Kothari,
2002).
Building on the foregoing relational approach, we examine which voices
(representing knowledges produced by different assemblages) were included
and excluded in the making of India’s controversial 2009 biodiesel policy. To
facilitate this analysis, we approach policymaking as a process of articulating
propositions (Latour, 2003, 2004; Prince, 2010; Freeman, 2012). A proposition
carrying in it the verb ‘to propose’ is different from a statement. Unlike a state-
ment, a proposition is always incomplete and in need of further adjustments. A
proposition opens up debate and deliberation. It does not carry any definitive a
priori authority. The process of developing propositions is uncertain: possible
outcomes are not predictable; nor can any probabilities be attached to them.
Methods
If voices are raised through relations with others in political assemblages,
mapping these voices requires a wide range of empirical materials from
diverse sources. Therefore, we rely on document analysis, semi-ethnographic
fieldwork, and semi-structured interviews. For document analysis, we obtained
policy-relevant documents through Internet searches, from libraries, and from
people working on biodiesel issues in India. The first author carried out
multi-sited fieldwork from September–December 2012, September 2013–
March 2014, and October–November 2015. She conducted 72 semi-structured
interviews with biodiesel stakeholders, including national- and state-level policy-
makers (25) from the ministries involved in biodiesel, researchers (26) from uni-
versities and research institutes such as The Energy and Resources Institute
(TERI), MS Swaminathan Research Foundation (MSSRF), and Tamil Nadu
Agricultural University (TNAU), as well as business representatives (11) and
activists (8). In addition, she visited agricultural research test fields, laboratories,
and processing facilities to observe biodiesel production in action.
The second period of fieldwork (2013–2014) mainly consisted of everyday
engagement with farmers and project officers involved in a specific biodiesel
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project called ‘Hassan biofuel park’ in Karnataka. During this trip, and the final
one (2015), a number of follow-up interviews were also conducted to clarify
issues that emerged from early analysis. Throughout the multi-sited fieldwork,
attempts were made to strike a careful balance between ‘following the actors’
as they travelled between different settings and ensuring substantial depth of
understanding of each specific socio-material setting (Boccagni, 2014).
We begin our analysis below by disentangling India’s 2009 biodiesel policy
into five propositions. These propositions facilitate detailed analysis of the
policy as a whole, based on the identification of the most salient issues in
India’s biodiesel policymaking as raised during our interviews and semi-ethno-
graphic fieldwork. We analyse the emergence of each proposition based on
events between 2003 and 2009, using the concepts of political assemblages
and repetitive singularity. Finally, we offer concluding remarks by reflecting
on our empirical findings.
Analysis: Articulating Biodiesel Propositions
The first two propositions we derive from India’s 2009 biofuel policy focus on
the policy’s core aims: (1) the legitimation of biodiesel promotion; (2) set
targets based on expected yields of biodiesel feedstock. The remaining three
propositions focus on strategies to realize the above two aims: (3) by acquiring
land to grow biodiesel; (4) by claiming to avoid competition with food pro-
duction; and (5) by promoting specific feedstocks. Each of these five prop-
ositions from the 2009 policy has a counterpart in the Indian government’s
2003 National Biodiesel Mission (Planning Commission, 2003).
Legitimating the Policy
The first policy proposition attempted to legitimate biodiesel production,
claiming that it ‘contributes to energy security, climate change mitigation,
apart from creating new employment opportunities and leading to environ-
mentally sustainable development’ (Government of India, 2009, p. 4). This
proposition’s four constituting benefits (energy security, climate change miti-
gation, employment opportunities and environmentally sustainable develop-
ment) were claimed to be generally realizable, in all socio-material settings,
without directing attention to how biodiesel production is actually carried
out. For example, if woodlands are cleared for biodiesel feedstock cultivation
(Romijn, 2011), then climate change mitigation and wider environmental sus-
tainability may both be compromised. Here, we examine how this proposition
was assembled after 2003, within the wider political-economic context at the
time in India and globally.
The 2003 Biodiesel Mission claimed that ‘rural energy needs’ will be met
(Planning Commission, 2003). The 2009 policy did not mention rural energy,
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instead emphasizing the reduction of national dependence on fossil fuel (oil)
imports to increase energy security. Which political assemblages managed to
push rural energy out of the picture between 2003 and 2009?
Encouraged by the 2003Mission, some non-governmental organizations such
as the Chennai-based AHIMSA had set up biodiesel production chains to meet
rural energy needs, often operating without a profit motive. AHIMSA’s project
sold small quantities of oilseeds to a Swiss company and the Indian Railways,
which made a marginal financial contribution towards sustaining local liveli-
hoods. Jatropha curcas yields turned out to be too small to enable a workable
rural energy system.
At the same time, transnational corporations started setting up commercial
joint ventures with domestic firms, which contracted farmers in Tamil Nadu
to grow Jatropha curcas as biodiesel feedstock. One such prominent joint
venture, D1 Mohan Bio Oils Ltd, failed to keep the promise of buying the
seeds supposed to be harvested three years after planting the saplings. The sap-
lings also failed to deliver the yields promised to farmers by the company’s
extension workers (Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010). Another firm, Southern
Online Bio Technologies Ltd, located their biodiesel production facilities in
special economic zones to facilitate the import of feedstock from abroad,
because domestic feedstock was hard to find, according to a manager of the
company.
During our interviews, some policymakers, critical biodiesel researchers, and
activists engaged in policy advocacy argued that the active presence of foreign
corporations since 2003 and their imports of feedstock were crucial to the pol-
itical assemblage that articulated ‘contributing to national energy security’ in the
2009 policy. This substituted ‘meeting rural energy needs’ articulated in the 2003
Mission. Clearly, ‘meeting rural energy needs’ offered fewer business opportu-
nities (and profits) than working towards national energy security (as most
energy is consumed in urban centres in India).
Critics further argued that the emphasis on national ‘energy security’ through
domestic biodiesel production was a smokescreen that hid the import of feed-
stock and the deep involvement of multinational corporations (MNCs). There
were in fact many instances of open promotion of MNC-involvement based
on the 2009 policy. In the political assemblages shaping this policy proposition,
the state, multinational corporations and imported feedstock appeared domi-
nant. The less powerful voices of small famers and supporting NGOs were mar-
ginalized. Through this first proposition, the 2009 policy thus further facilitated
corporate presence and control.
Regarding climate change, a number of academic studies suggested that bio-
diesel from Jatropha curcas did not necessarily result in the carbon savings
claimed by biodiesel proponents (Kanninen et al., 2007). Accounting for the
replacement of existing biomass with Jatropha curcas, and for the use of fertili-
zers and irrigation required to cultivate the feedstock crop, the amount and
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timing of CO2 emissions associated with biodiesel production varied greatly. It all
depended on the specific socio-material conditions in which feedstock crops were
cultivated and processed into biodiesel – differences that were closely associated
with themore or less industrialized smallholder and plantation-based production
chains (see e.g. Reinhardt et al., 2007; Romijn, 2011). The more industrialized
conditions of cultivation used chemical inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides
as well as carbon-intensive irrigation relying on groundwater extraction or
dammed reservoirs and canals. Therefore, depending on the specific political
assemblage of biodiesel production that CO2 emissions were part of, they raised
very different voices. Yet, these differences with regard to CO2 emissions were
not articulated in India’s biodiesel policy and political questions about the
socio-material conditions of biodiesel feedstock production were sidestepped.
The policy isolated CO2 particles out of the different assemblages of inter-
related socio-material entities that bring them into existence and produce
their articulations. The policy proposition only highlighted the potential
benefit of reduced emissions. This turned CO2’s voice into the repetitive singu-
larity of ‘reduced and avoided emissions through Jatropha cultivation and use’.
As a result, CO2’s multiple (possible) articulations depending on the different
political assemblages it was a part of were erased out of the policy proposition.
The single voice of CO2 dominating the policy proposition as evidence was
raised by the political assemblage of biodiesel promotion. All alternate assem-
blages through which CO2 emissions may be voiced in diverse ways were mar-
ginalized. If diverse voices of CO2 were included in the proposition, raised
through spokespersons such as citizen scientists and environmental activists,
then India’s biodiesel policy might have included the specific socio-material con-
ditions required for achieving ‘reduced and avoided’ CO2 emissions through the
cultivation of biodiesel crops.
Reducing an entity to a repetitive singularity in a policy proposition facilitated
the claim that the policy proposition was easily scalable, through straightforward
transfer to other socio-material settings without any adjustments. For national
policymakers, biodiesel production was of little use after all, in replacing fossil
fuels, if it was not done at scale.
About employment generation, our respondents narrated how government
biodiesel schemes implementing the 2003 Mission paid people in rural areas
to plant Jatropha curcas and other feedstock bushes/trees on government-
owned land. Yet the same schemes did not pay people for recurring work
such as taking care of the plants and collecting seeds, under the assumption
that selling the seeds provided adequate income to perform these tasks too.
The 2003Mission also envisaged employment opportunities on large plantations
or in biodiesel production facilities such as transesterification plants. However,
during our fieldwork, we learnt that very few companies and other organizations
were running by 2009. Our interlocutors were unanimous in expressing that this
is because Jatropha curcas’s yields were significantly lower than expected.
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The voices of rural people supposedly benefitting from biodiesel’s employ-
ment generation were articulated in the policy only as ‘people in need of employ-
ment.’ These people were presumed poor according to economic definitions of
‘below poverty line’ households, and believed to be keen on any employment
opportunities in biodiesel production without constraints. The policy made no
reference to the workers’ skills, tools, or any other entities composing their pol-
itical assemblages required to participate in biodiesel production. Also excluded
from the policy were the other assemblages that constitute rural people’s every-
day lives, in terms of their domestic, agricultural, or local administrative
responsibilities.
Some of our interviewees, particularly social scientists and businesspeople,
observed that rural people were reluctant to join or maintain their participation
in biodiesel projects. For example, Mr Ramar of the MGR Jatropha Biodiesel
Project in Tamil Nadu noted that people were unwilling to work against the
wages offered. He attributed the failure of their Jatropha project to this unwill-
ingness. In contrast, the reason mentioned by policy officials interviewed for
people’s lack of participation in biodiesel production was often simply
people’s inability to grasp how much income they could have earned from
biofuel projects. This reasoning turned rural people’s voices into a repetitive
singularity stressing their need for employment, while disarticulating them
from the political assemblages of their everyday life (beyond a predefined
poverty line and the presumed lack of employment). Excluded from the
policy proposition were therefore voices associated with people’s skills, their
occupational concerns (for example as small farmers or landless workers), alter-
nate employment opportunities, and other socio-material entities composing
their domestic and farming assemblages.
Beyond the official policy propositions, political assemblages of rural people
and their NGO partners produced alternate voices regarding the desirability
of biodiesel employment. These alternate voices often expressed sharp diver-
gence from the 2009 policy’s articulation. For example, farmers in Hassan dis-
trict of Karnataka argued that income from a day’s work as a farm-labourer
was considerably higher than that from a day spent collecting and processing
biodiesel feedstock seeds (see Figure 1). Voices such as those of the farmers
from Hassan, if included more clearly in the proposition, would have produced
a very different policy.
Setting Targets
‘An indicative target of 20% blending of biofuels, both for biodiesel and bio-
ethanol by 2017 is proposed. Blending levels prescribed in regard to biodiesel
are intended to be recommendatory in the near time’ (Government of India,
2009, p. 4). This policy proposition on targets differed from the 2003 Mission:
‘Targets need to be set up for bio-diesel production. The objective is to gradually
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raise it to take it to 20% in the year 2011–12 beginning with 5% in 2006–07’
(Planning Commission, 2003, p. x). The 2003 Mission further pointed out
how calculations on the achievability of these targets were performed using:
(a) yield estimates of Jatropha curcas, presumably from agronomists’ test
fields; (b) the expected oil content of Jatropha seeds extracted using a laboratory
setup; and (c) the projected diesel demand in 2011–12 based on growth scen-
arios developed by economists. Relying on these the Mission calculates that a
total of 11.19 million hectares of land were needed to achieve the blending
target of 20% in 2011–12. No uncertainties were articulated. All differences
between lands in terms of soil types and irrigation facilities were marginalized.
The many interrelated entities constituting the political assemblages that pro-
duced oilseed yields (e.g. rainfall, irrigation, fertilizers, plant diseases, and
pruning techniques) remained excluded.
The 2009 policy proposition on targets was more modest than the 2003
Mission proposition and was not based on calculations of Jatropha curcas’
expected yields but rather on the promise of achieving targets by developing
new high-yielding varieties of oilseeds. What was behind this shift with regard
to both the targets themselves and their underpinning?
Figure 1. After collection, seeds were not ready for the market. Each seed also needed to be
individually de-shelled, which was done by hitting the seed with a stone or stick. According
to our respondents, this approximately doubled the amount of time required to get the
seeds ready for market.
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During our interviews, scientists, policymakers, and activists unanimously
agreed that the Mission’s calculations were subject to widespread criticism
from around 2006 onwards. Critics highlight the Mission’s authoring agency,
the National Planning Commission, made a mistake by taking the yield of a
stand-alone bush as representative of a bush in a densely planted field. On the
latter fields, Jatropha recorded highly variable yields. For example, the political
assemblage of scientists at the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University (TNAU) and
plant scientists from the firm JOil in Coimbatore recorded wide differences in
yields from carefully monitored cultivation practices and soil types (see Figure
2). Other research assemblages composed of experimental plots on which bio-
diesel varieties were intercropped with various kinds of lentils (e.g. in the test
fields around the office of the Hassan biofuel park or the test fields of research
organizations TERI and the Indian Institute of Oilseed Research), also produced
lower yields than those expected by the 2003 Mission.
Crucially, a study on smallholders’ actual experiences with Jatropha argued
that most smallholders growing Jatropha achieved very low yields (Ariza-Mon-
tobbio et al., 2010). In research sites, such as those of JOil, TNAU, and TERI,
resource constraints on cultivation were very rarely comparable to the con-
straints faced by smallholder farmers (e.g. regarding the availability of water
and other agricultural inputs). From interviews with organizations working
directly with smallholders, it became clear that smallholders’ political assem-
blages of Jatropha cultivation, each constituted by a specific web of entities
including plot sizes, irrigation sources, soil types, fertilizers, and skills, produced
a wide range of Jatropha yields (diverging from official ‘expected yields’). On
rainfed smallholdings, yields were made more variable by uncertain rainfall
Figure 2. Board hanging in the maintenance shed of one of JOils trial plots. Each part of the trial
plot (letters A–R) received a different number of hours of irrigation on different weekdays. Photo:
[first author].
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patterns. Instead of directly articulating this variability of yields, and admitting
that the yields were likely to be much lower than the 2003 Mission’s expectation,
the 2009 policy tied blending targets to the promise of ‘high-yielding planting
material’ that was believed to solve the problem of low yields.
Beyond the assemblages that shaped the 2009 policy, a number of civil society
and academic spokespersons associated diverse voices with ‘high-yielding plant-
ing materials’. They problematized the policy’s repetitive singularity of deliver-
ing higher yields. These diverse voices were based on experiences with different
farming assemblages between 2003 and 2009. For example, two NGOs, Grain
India and the Society for the Promotion of Wasteland Development (SPWD),
as well as a scientist from the Directorate of Oilseed Research, highlighted the
disjuncture between smallholder farms and research fields. They pointed out
that on small farms, high-yielding planting materials’ promised yields were
difficult to achieve due to local resource constraints. Some NGOs, including
SPWD, Anthra, and Grain India, also noted that cultivating high-yielding var-
ieties often required the extensive use of external farm-inputs such as chemical
pesticides and fertilizers that can cause serious environmental harm.
Such diverse voices highlighted uncertainties about feasible and desirable
blending targets based on high-yielding varieties. Yet, they were largely silent
in the 2009 policy. If included, the diverse voices can account for possible
increases in socio-economic inequality due to the use of high-yielding varieties.
Experience with these varieties was shown to firstly benefit the resource-rich
farmers who can invest in the new seeds and other inputs such as fertilizers, trac-
tors, and mechanical harvesters (Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010).
Land Where to Grow
The 2009 policy stipulated that biodiesel crops be grown: ‘on Government/com-
munity wasteland, degraded or fallow land in forest and non-forest areas.’ ‘Con-
tract farming on private wasteland could also be taken up […]. Plantations on
agricultural lands will be discouraged. […] In all cases pertaining to land use
for the plantations, consultations would be undertaken with the local commu-
nities throughGramPanchayats/GramSabhas’ (Government of India, 2009, p. 7).
In contrast, the 2003 Biodiesel Mission made a blanket claim that a total of
13.4 million hectares that was subdivided into categories ranging from agro-for-
estry to fallow lands, were available for biodiesel production. This claim was
ostensibly based on calculations carried out by experts of the Planning Commis-
sion. Unlike the 2009 policy, public consultations were not emphasized in the
2003 Mission.
Between 2003 and 2009, spokespersons such as activists and farmers chal-
lenge the claim that ‘wastelands’ were uncultivated and unused. Such dissenting
voices were, for example, central at a 2007 meeting of civil society actors in
Hyderabad, attended amongst others by NGOs Anthra and SPWD. Here, it
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was stressed that so-called wastelands were crucial for the food sovereignty of
many rural families (Lavanya, 2007). By highlighting different uses of so-
called wastelands across rural assemblages, such as for grazing and foraging,
these voices helped transform the 2003 Mission’s proposition about the availa-
bilty of ample lands for Jatropha curcas cultivation. Unfortunately, however, the
farmers’ and activists’ voices did not succeed in removing the term ‘wasteland’
from the 2009 policy.
In addition, activists asked if high yields of biodiesel crops can be realized on
‘degraded-’ or ‘wastelands,’ then the lands can surely also be used to grow food?
The farmers we met during a visit to Anthra’s office in Hyderabad described how
government officials entered their village’s grazing lands and planted Jatropha
curcas and Pongamia pinnata (both biodiesel feedstocks), without prior per-
mission and consent from any resident of the village. Farmers also admitted
that they angrily uprooted the unwanted sapplings.
As Baka (2013) documented, plans to use ‘wastelands’ to realize biodiesel
blending targets were part of a wider project by the Indian state, of converting
‘wastelands’ to ostensibly more ‘productive’ uses. This project can be traced
back to British colonial times, when the privatization of lands classified as
‘waste’ was carried out in the name of social welfare (Gidwani, 1992; de Hoop
and Arora, 2017). However, Baka argued that improving productivity or
social welfare was simply a façade in the mechanics of ‘wasteland governmental-
ity,’ which facilitated landgrabbing and rent appropriation by powerful actors in
the state and private companies (Baka, 2013). Baka’s claims were corroborated
by a number of reports documenting extensive landgrabbing (e.g. Shiva and
Shankar, 2008; Lahiri, 2009; Klaus et al., 2011). Most reported land grabs took
place before 2009, yet their voices were barely included in the 2009 policy.
Instead the policy included, ostensibly as evidence, the voices of those holding
the political and economic power to acquire ‘wastelands’ for cultivating ‘high-
yielding varieties.’ These powerful voices were produced by assemblages con-
trolled by associations of resource-rich farmers, agro-industrial firms that sell
modernizing farm-inputs, and the agricultural research institutions that play a
central role in developing the ‘high-yielding varieties.’
Within villages, at the local level, some farmers aligned with the powerful
voices of biofuel promotion through policy. Farmers favouring biofuels included
those who relied on industrially produced feed for their animals; did not own
animals; or owned enough private land to meet their own cattle-grazing
needs. For example, in a village in Hassan district of Karnataka, a local leader
took the initiative to invite the government to plant biodiesel crops on public
land used by others in the village as grazing land. By becoming the sole spokes-
person for political assemblages associated with ‘uncultivated’ land in his village,
he marginalized the land’s diverse and often contested uses.
Beyond these dominating political assemblages, diverse spokespersons such
as small/marginal farmers and activists could have challenged the claimed
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availability of land for biofuel cultivation (as we document in the following
section). These voices had the potential to be raised through public ‘consultation’
with local communities. Such consultation was recommended by the 2009
policy. However, the policy failed to specify what ‘consultation’ actually meant
and how binding the outcomes of consultations were going to be. Also, there
was no recognition of the diversity of voices within ‘local communities.’
Different members belonging even to the same community, each embedded in
their own assemblages that entangle landownership, soils of particular qualities,
irrigation sources with caste and gender relations, often raised voices that were
radically distinct from each other. Yet, no efforts were made to count this diver-
sity of voices as evidence in the policy. Instead, the policy was turned into a
repetitive singularity that simply proclaimed the need of public consultation,
without actually specifying ways to include the outcomes of such consultations
into policy. This also meant that the policy proposition was designed to be
applied across diverse socio-material settings in India, without sensitivity to
differences between and within these settings.
Food versus Fuel
‘The Indian approach to biofuels, in particular, is somewhat different to the
current international approaches which could lead to conflict with food security.
It is based solely on non-food feedstocks to be raised on degraded or wastelands
that are not suited to agriculture, thus avoiding a possible conflict of fuel vs. food
security’ (Government of India, 2009, pp. 3–4).
In the government’s 2003 Mission, Jatropha curcas was the feedstock of
choice. This choice was justified by agronomic knowledge claims of Jatropha’s
productivity without requiring substantial farm-inputs. The only reference to
avoiding competition with other uses of lands, appeared in a foreword by the
deputy prime minister L. K. Advani: ‘The nation is facing a shortage of edible
and non-edible oil. The existing high price of edible oil and the full use of
tree borne oil seeds for various purposes suggest that organized biodiesel pro-
duction for blending is possible only if plantation of selected species is taken
up in compact areas’ (Planning Commission, 2003). Such articulations of food
vs. fuel competition were excluded from the 2009 policy.
In practice, many of our respondents observed that biodiesel feedstocks’ com-
petition with non-fuel uses was widespread between 2003 and 2009. For
example, in Karnataka’s Hassan district, Pongamia pinnata seeds were produced
for the soap industry, and the oil was widely used for lighting lamps in religious
ceremonies. A proportion of the seeds used for these purposes was diverted to
feedstock for biodiesel, after the inception of Hassan Bio-Fuel Park in 2006.
The Bio-Fuel Park also included Neem seed in its list of potential sources of feed-
stock to increase biodiesel production in the future. Yet, oil from neem (Azadir-
achta indica) is used ‘traditionally’ across India, for a range of medicinal and bio-
pesticidal purposes. Such political assemblages producing diverse knowledges
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and practices for non-biofuel uses of oilseeds such as pongamia (and possibly, of
neem) were excluded from the 2009 policy.
Rather than taking such non-biofuel purposes seriously, the 2009 policy pro-
posed to avoid food versus fuel conflict just by using non-edible crops and
growing them on ‘degraded’ lands or ‘wastelands.’ The policy’s aim was to cir-
cumvent the criticism that many biofuel policies received as part of global
debates on biofuels’ influence on food grain availability and prices (Baka,
2014). Voices associated with other entities constituting agricultural political
assemblages, such as water, labour, farm-inputs, sunlight and root-space, were
excluded from the policy.
In Hassan district, we observed how agricultural extension officers advise
farmers to grow biodiesel crops, particularly Pongamia pinnata, on the bound-
aries of the farms that were used for growing food. This advice did not take
into account the trees’ possible interactions with other entities in farming assem-
blages. For example, during our fieldwork, farmers demonstrated how leaves of
the Pongammia trees shield sunlight from adjoining food crops (see Figure 3).
Farmers also acted as spokespersons for their crops that struggled to grow roots
amidst Pongammia trees’ extensive root system. Such voices raised by farmers,
and produced by agricultural assemblages, were missing from the 2009 policy.
Furthermore, biodiesel feedstock trees on farm boundaries competed with the
many other uses of these boundaries. In agricultural assemblages, the boundaries
played a role as grazing patches for cattle, as pathways providing access to other
people’s lands, and as grounds for planting fruit or timber trees. Many of these
uses of farm boundaries yielded useful returns to farmers, but required less
labour than harvesting biodiesel feedstock. Throughout our fieldwork, small-
holder farmers and farmworkers voiced these issues based on knowledges
Figure 3. Pongamia trees’ large canopies casting a shade on the main food crops grown by
farmers. Such shade and the trees’ extensive root systems reduced food crop productivity,
according to farmers.
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produced by their political assemblages through everyday labouring and farming
practices. In addition, activists from organizations such as the SPWD acted as
spokespersons for forms of competition arising out of growing biodiesel on
village lands otherwise used for grazing and firewood collection. This compe-
tition risked compromising food production and wider rural sustainability, as
biodiesel production was promoted to achieve policy targets (see e.g. Lavanya,
2007).
Unfortunately, such voices of ‘competition’ were rarely raised outside the
local situations in which competition actually took place. Perhaps due to the
challenges they posed to the Indian government’s biodiesel promotion, such
voices are not made to count as evidence in the 2009 policy. If included as evi-
dence, diverse voices could highlight forms of competition beyond fuel vs. food
security that dominated the 2009 policy proposition. For example, the inclusion
of diverse voices could have higlighteded how competition can take place
through roots systems of biodiesel feedstocks and the shadow cast on food
crops by the feedstocks’ foliage, even when they were grown on lands where
no food was normally grown. The exclusion was extended also to non-edible
products such as soaps and biopesticides produced from oilseeds. By excluding
diverse voices, and by marginalizing associated political assemblages, the policy
proposition’s repetitive singularity could be claimed as easily transferable to
different socio-material settings. According to the policy, non-edible oilseeds
could be grown anywhere without worrying about (food vs. fuel) ‘competition,’
as long as food cultivation was not practised in the same location.
Jatropha Curcas and 399 Other Non-edible Oilseed Species
‘There are over 400 species of trees bearing non-edible oilseeds in the country.
The potential of all these species will be exploited, depending on their techno-
economic viability for the production of biofuels’ (Government of India, 2009,
p. 7). In contrast, the 2003 Mission observed: ‘There are many tree species
which bear seeds rich in oil having properties of an excellent fuel and which
can be processed into a diesel-substitute. […] to start the programme, the advan-
tage is clearly in favour of Jatropha’ (Planning Commission, 2003, p. 111).
Moving beyond the 2003 Mission’s focus on Jatropha, the 2009 policy broad-
ened the scope of biodiesel production to more than 400 oilseed species. Choos-
ing the right species out of these 400 different species was made contingent on
‘techno-economic viability,’ a term that was not further defined in the policy. In
contrast, the 2003 Mission offered concrete reasons for selecting Jatropha curcas
including its supposed high yield (with low input requirements and short matu-
ration time), its carbon-storing ability, and the medicinal value of its leaves and
stems.
Widening the scope from Jatropha curcas to over 400 species was linked with
many voices produced by political assemblages of biodiesel cultivation between
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2003 and 2009. Earlier in this paper, we highlighted the issue of actual Jatropha
yields that deviated from the 2003 Mission’s prediction. Our interlocutors
further noted that to produce sizeable yields, Jatropha plants needed much
longer than the two years noted in the 2003 Mission. They also highlighted
that while some plants produce high yields of seeds, the oil content of each
seed was often very low.
We learnt from the interlocutors that many of these voices had been raised
earlier during biofuel meetings organized by government bodies (attended by
farmers, businesses, and researchers) and in reports produced by research insi-
tutes (e.g. Singh et al., 2006). Yet, the same voices underscoring the highly variable
performance of Jatropha curcas plants were not included as ‘evidence’ in formal
gatherings and reports. As a result, Jatropha’s performance was turned into a
repetitive singularity, in relation to the 2003 Mission’ articulation of expected
yields. Jatropha’s diverse production assemblages raised the spectre of uncertain-
ties encountered in practice, contingent on soil quality of the lands onwhich Jatro-
pha was grown, the farm-inputs that could be afforded, the rainfall patterns
experienced, and the care given to the plants while also fulfilling other domestic
and livelihood responsibilities. Such uncertainties highlighted the difficulties of
producing the biodiesel feedstock in ample quantities to fulfill the 2003 blending
targets. In turn, these difficulties not only forced the government to revise its
blending targets in the 2009 policy, it also resulted in broadening the scope of
the policy to include a large number of oilseed species. Eventually, the policy
articulated an expectation that its blending targets could be met if a wide
variety of oilseed species were included. Yet, this articulation was not justified
through the inclusion of diverse voices as ‘evidence’ that demonstrated how unli-
kely it was that the blending targets could actually be met.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied how India’s national policy marginalized the
diversity of voices based on multiple knowledges related to biodiesel production.
Focusing on the period between 2003 and 2009, we observed the production of
diverse knowledges by political assemblages that cultivate, process, and observe
biodiesel feedstocks in India. Rather than taking seriously these diverse voices,
India’s 2009 policy attempts to promote biodiesel production as a repetitive
singularity. Doing this, the policy relies on dominant techno-scientific knowl-
edges as ‘evidence’ produced by modern expert assemblages, while excluding
plural contested voices of ‘biodiesel promotion.’ The policy thus obscures the
work of many political assemblages that produce the knowledges represented
by the plural voices. In this way, the policy further marginalized the ‘excluded,’
both humans such as smallholders and farmworkers and non-humans such as
‘degraded lands’ and biopesticides produced using oilseeds (that are represented
by their respective spokespersons across agriculture, activism, and academia).
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By marginalizing diverse voices and obscuring their political assemblages, the
repetitive singularities composing a policy can hide the more or less powerfully
entrenched interests of actors benefitting from the policy’s promoted interven-
tions. For example, there was little discussion in India’s biofuel policy of substi-
tuting fossil fuel imports with joint venture profiteers setting up biodiesel
facilities (and exacerbating rural land grabs). Similarly, the interests of the
Indian automotive industry were hidden from view, who were likely to be
some of the prime beneficiaries of diesel-based mobility at the expense of
alternatives such as bicycling. Earlier critical research on biofuels highlighted
these wider political-economic interests underpinning pro-biofuel policies (e.g.
Franco et al., 2010; White and Dasgupta, 2010; Levidow et al., 2012; Chaliganti
and Müller, 2016; Oliveira et al., 2017). They did not, however, investigate the
politics of excluding diverse knowledges and of obscuring multiple assemblages,
in shaping and legitimizing biofuel policies in India.
Complementing the political-economic analyses, we have shown how
modern expert voices were made dominant as ‘evidence’ (often manifesting as
repetitive singularities) in India’s 2009 biofuel policy, while their political assem-
blages were hidden from view. The latter process was the ontological counterpart
of obscuring elite political-economic interests in biofuel policies. Both types of
obscuring relied on elite voices that represented expert knowledges associated
with modern sciences, engineering, and the social sciences (particularly econ-
omics). Extracted from the political assemblages of their uncertain construction,
the ‘apolitical’ and ‘universal’ language of expert knowledges provided the dis-
cursive curtain of evidence-based certainty that was articulated in policy. Oper-
ating behind this policy curtain, powerful economic interests promoted the
entities and assemblages that benefit them, while excluding weaker voices and
obscuring their political assemblages.
While documenting many such situated exclusions, our analysis highlights
that policy propositions must not be considered as easily transferrable to
diverse socio-material situations. Situated contingency can be included in pol-
icymaking processes, if they are made sensitive to ontological differences
between political assemblages across socio-material settings. Such sensitivity
to differences between assemblages, and thereby between the voices they
produce, highlights the importance of approaching policies as interventions
that make realities. Not only do the policies help make new socio-material rea-
lities as they are enacted, they are also made by the socio-material realities
formed of (expert) assemblages through which policy knowledges are produced.
This points to a normative question: what kind of ‘sustainable’ realities need to
be promoted by policies such as those for biofuel development, in order to
address climate change and other forms of unsustainability produced by mod-
ernization in India (Arora et al., 2019)?
The first normative implication stemming out of our analysis is that policy-
making must resist turning into repetitive singularities the entities, practices
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or realities that are promoted. Rather than using repetitive singularities to
promote the new entities (or realities) as ‘sustainable,’ policymaking must poli-
ticize sustainable development by taking seriously the diverse voices attached to
each new entity. Taking an entity’s diverse voices seriously points to the recog-
nition of how socio-material relations (of power) constitute the political assem-
blages of knowledge production associated with the entity. Taking diverse voices
seriously also implies resistance against the assimilation or disqualification of
weaker voices by more powerful ones (Arora, 2019). Taking diverse voices
seriously thus means ‘putting the last first’ (Chambers, 1983), by making
central in policy the voices raised by the most marginalized actors in society
such as landless workers and smallholders.
Politicization of policymaking for sustainable development relates to knowl-
edges in two ways: epistemological and ontological. The former points to pol-
itical contestation and deliberation between diverse competing and
collaborating voices based on alternate knowledges. This requires asking ques-
tions such as: how and why are particular ‘expert’ knowledges prioritized as
‘evidence’ in policy? How can plural knowledges be taken seriously through
participatory policymaking? Asking such questions in our analysis, we have
tried to show that they are usefully addressed by directing attention to the pol-
itical assemblages in which knowledges are relationally produced. We have
documented how voices raised by a range of actors in society, such as
farmers and activists, are not just unscientific and non-technical opinions.
But rather, they are based on diverse knowledges produced through socio-
material relations in political assemblages that enact practices such as
farming and activism.
Ontological politics begins by making public the political assemblages of
knowledge production (Latour and Wiebel, 2005). However, such making
public of assemblages offers no guarantees for inclusive policy, due to two
kinds of adverse possibilities. First, it can allow policy experts to mobilize the
prevailing dominance of modern ‘techno-scientific’ facts as apolitical evidence
produced by ostensibly well-managed laboratories and test stations. These can
then be argued to be generally applicable, further extending the dominance of
modern facts in formatting realities. Second, by belittling the marginality and
informality of assemblages that produce diverse voices raised by civil society
practitioners such as smallholders and activists, alternate trajectories of socio-
material development beyond modernization are marginalized (Arora et al.,
2019). These ontological politics highlight questions such as: how can the
world-making power of modernizing policies be limited? How can the scope
of resistance against modern power/knowledge be expanded? How can alternate
trajectories based on marginalized people’s knowledges be promoted?
Rather than offering definitive ‘solutions’ to these questions of ontological
politics, we conclude with three proposals for more inclusive policymaking:
(a) articulation of diverse voices associated with people and things, but
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particularly the marginalized voices in each socio-material setting; (b) recogniz-
ing each entity’s multiplicity produced by different relational compositions of
political assemblages; and (c) highlighting the adjustments entailed in translat-
ing a policy from one socio-material setting to another. We hope that these pro-
posals will be experimented with and rearticulated, particularly in actual
practices performed by policymaking and knowledge production assemblages.
Note
1. A standardized reference for colour coding samples of soil (Latour, 1999, pp. 58–61).
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